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Out of Bounds: Commerce Clause Protection 
from State Antitrust Statutes for Regional 
Athletic Conferences 
ABSTRACT 
Collegiate athletic conferences generate billions of dollars annually.  With 
conferences competing for $300 million plus television contracts, it has 
become increasingly important that conferences align themselves with the 
highest quality institutions possible.  As a result, individual institutions 
have shifted from one conference to another with hopes of cashing in on 
higher revenue opportunities.  The regional athletic conferences that 
govern these individual institutions are different from most commercial 
actors because their very nature requires that they be regulated on a 
national/regional level if they are to exist at all.  Each member of a 
conference voluntarily agrees to be bound by the conference’s constitution 
and by-laws.  As such, it is imperative that the by-laws and rules be applied 
uniformly across the conference in order to have any possibility of 
functioning effectively. 
 
However, subjecting regional athletic conferences to state antitrust laws 
imposes an excessive burden on the conference without a corresponding 
local benefit.  If regional athletic conferences were subject to state antitrust 
claims, the member institution’s state with the strictest antitrust laws would 
effectively regulate the activities of the member institutions in other states.  
In effect, a conference would be stripped of its ability to freely adopt and 
enforce its own procedural regulations.  To avoid these burdens, regional 
athletic conferences should be able to seek protection by invoking the 
dormant side of the Commerce Clause in the face of state antitrust claims.  
The trajectory of case law on the subject suggests that it is logical that 
regional athletic conferences should enjoy the protection of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As of April 2014, the total annual revenue for National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) affiliated institutions was estimated at 
approximately $10.6 billion.1  Of that total figure, the Power 52 conferences 
combined to produce approximately $1.48 billion in total revenue.3  With 
increasing revenues and conference realignment at an all-time high,4 some 
conferences amended their bylaws to include exit penalty provisions.  Most 
notably, the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) amended its constitution to 
include a withdrawal payment.5  That provision became the subject of 
 
 1. NCAA College Athletics Statistics, STAT. BRAIN RES. INST. (Apr. 26, 2015), http://
www.statisticbrain.com/ncaa-college-athletics-statistics/ [http://perma.cc/78G6-NKWV]. 
 2. The Power 5 conferences include: Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC); The Big Ten 
Conference (Big Ten); Big 12 Conference (Big 12); PAC-12 Conference (PAC-12); and the 
Southeastern Conference (SEC).  See, e.g., Ken Bradley, Week 3 Power 5 Conference 
Rankings, SPORTING NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football-
news/4655310-power-5-conference-power-rankings-week-3-sec-big-ten-pac-12-acc-big-12 
[http://perma.cc/3XXD-AEP6]. 
 3. The ACC produced $291.7 million in revenue.  Andrea Adelson, Average of 
$20.8M to Each in ACC, ESPN (June 6, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/11044060/acc-distributed-record-2917-million-total-revenue-2013-14-
fiscal-year [http://perma.cc/9CME-L8Z].  The Big Ten produced $318.4 million in revenue 
and the SEC produced $314.5 million in revenue.  Steve Berkowitz, Big Ten Still Leads 
Leagues in College Sports Revenue, USA TODAY (May 16, 2014, 10:41 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/05/16/big-ten-conference-highest-
revenue-college-sports/9190139/ [http://perma.cc/9EUG-25A2].  The Big 12 produced $221 
million in total revenue.  Wendell Barnhouse, Big 12 Announces Record Revenue 
Distribution, BIG12SPORTS.COM (May 30, 2014), http://www.big12sports.com/
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209513755 [http://perma.cc/928V-K729].  The PAC-12 
produced $334 million in revenue.  Dennis Dodd, Pac-12 Returned Only 68 Percent of its 
Record Revenues to Schools, CBSSPORTS.COM (July 17, 2014, 3:28 AM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennis-dodd/24590668/pac-12-returned-
only-68-percent-of-its-record-revenues-to-schools [http://perma.cc/M44M-U48X]. 
 4. From the start of 2010 through the date of this article, the Power 5 conferences 
experienced the following realignment: (1) the ACC added Notre Dame University, 
Syracuse University, the University of Louisville, and the University of Pittsburgh while 
losing the University of Maryland as a member; (2) the Big Ten added the University of 
Nebraska, Rutgers University, and the University of Maryland; (3) the Big 12 added West 
Virginia University and Texas Christian University while losing the University of Nebraska 
and the University of Colorado; (4) the PAC-12 added the University of Colorado and the 
University of Utah; and (5) the SEC added Texas A&M University and the University of 
Missouri.  Matt Peloquin, Conference Realignment, CONFERENCESPORTSINFO.COM, 
http://collegesportsinfo.com/conference-realignment-grid/ [http://perma.cc/Z964-4JRF] (last 
updated Sept. 1, 2015). 
 5. Section IV-5 of the current version of the ACC Constitution provides: 
Upon official notice of withdrawal, the [ACC] member will be subject to a 
withdrawal payment, as liquidated damages, in an amount equal to one and 
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litigation between the conference and the University of Maryland when the 
University of Maryland publicly announced that it would leave the ACC in 
order to join the Big Ten Conference.6  In response to allegations of a state 
antitrust violation, the ACC sought dismissal on the grounds that the 
application of Maryland’s antitrust statutes violated the Commerce Clause 
of the United States Constitution.7 
Congress is granted the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States . . . .”8  The Commerce Clause, phrased as an affirmative 
grant of power, is a limitation on state powers.  The clause limits state 
interference with interstate commerce, even without legislation 
implemented by Congress.9  As such, the Commerce Clause can operate to 
invalidate state statutes where the indirect effects of a piece of legislation 
on interstate commerce impose a burden on commerce that is “clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”10  This operation of the 
Commerce Clause is generally referred to as the “dormant” Commerce 
Clause.  In the context of collegiate athletics, interstate commerce is 
excessively burdened when the state statute attempts to govern “phases of 
 
one-quarter (1¼) times the total operating budget of the Conference . . . which is 
in effect as of the date of the official notice of withdrawal.  The [ACC] may offset 
the amount of such payment against any distributions otherwise due such member 
for any Conference year.  Any remaining amount due shall be paid by the 
withdrawing member within 30 days after the effective date of withdrawal. 
ATL. COAST CONFERENCE, ACC MANUAL 21 (2012–2013), 
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/bc/genrel/auto_pdf/2012-
13/misc_non_event/2012_13_ACC.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8ST-NHUQ]. 
 6. Atl. Coast Conference v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, 751 S.E.2d 612, 614 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2013).  After receiving notice of withdrawal from the University of Maryland, the 
ACC filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish the obligations of each party 
under the conference constitution.  Id. at 614–15.  On January 18, 2013, the University of 
Maryland filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland 
asserting that the withdrawal penalty violated Maryland’s antitrust statutes.  Complaint at 
34–38, Bd. of Regents v. Atl. Coast Conference, No. CAL13-02189, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. 
LEXIS 4 (June 27, 2013).  The case was eventually settled out of court before the ultimate 
issues could be reached.  Steve Berkowitz, ACC, Maryland Reach Settlement on Exit Fee, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/
08/08/acc-maryland-settle-lawsuits-buyout-big-ten-conference/13781545/ 
[https://perma.cc/3WN6-TFTU]. 
 7. Defendant Atlantic Coast Conference’s Statement of Grounds and Authorities in 
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 6–11, 
Bd. of Regents v. Atl. Coast Conference, No. CAL13-02189, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 4 
(June 27, 2013). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 9. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992). 
 10. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1959)). 
3
Madden: Out of Bounds: Commerce Clause Protection from State Antitrust St
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law,
112 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:109 
the national commerce which . . . demand that their regulation . . . be 
prescribed by a single authority.”11 
As a general rule, national collegiate and professional sports leagues 
are subject to federal antitrust statutes.12  However, these leagues have 
faced numerous state antitrust allegations as well.13  In the face of these 
state antitrust claims, national collegiate and professional sports leagues 
have sought protection by invoking the Commerce Clause as a defense.14  
Courts have been willing to apply the “dormant” Commerce Clause when 
assessing these allegations, declining to extend the reach of state antitrust 
statutes to national collegiate and professional sports leagues.15  Operation 
of the “dormant” Commerce Clause, however, has been applied to national 
leagues rather than more regionalized leagues like collegiate athletic 
conferences.  This leaves the question of whether regional athletic 
conferences, like the ACC, will be able to successfully assert the 
Commerce Clause as a defense or will instead be subject to state antitrust 
laws. 
This Comment answers that question in calling for—no matter the 
merits of a party’s state antitrust claim—the extension of Commerce 
Clause protection to regional athletic conferences like the Power 5 
conferences against state antitrust claims.  By tracing the history of state 
antitrust law, and its relationship with federal antitrust law and the 
Commerce Clause, this Comment illustrates the reasonableness of 
extending Commerce Clause protection.  Part I traces the history of state 
antitrust law and its relationship with federal antitrust law.  Part II provides 
an overview of the Commerce Clause and its application to state antitrust 
laws.  Part III analyzes the establishment of the Commerce Clause 
protection as it pertains to national collegiate and professional sports 
 
 11. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (quoting Cooley v. 
Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)). 
 12. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 
(N.D. Cal. 2014).  But see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 
Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l 
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  This trilogy of cases established a professional 
baseball exemption from federal antitrust law. 
 13. See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1983).  In 
Partee, Dennis Partee, a former kicker and punter for the San Diego Chargers, brought suit 
against the National Football League (NFL) claiming that several of the league’s rules 
violated California’s antitrust statute.  Id. at 676. 
 14. Id. at 677 (“The Chargers contend . . . that application of the Cartwright Act was a 
violation of the commerce and supremacy clauses of the Constitution.”). 
 15. Id. at 676 (“In accordance with other decisions considering the applicability of state 
antitrust laws to national professional sports leagues, we conclude that the Cartwright Act is 
not applicable to the interstate activities of professional football.”). 
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leagues.  Finally, Part IV advocates for the extension of the Commerce 
Clause protection to regionalized athletic conferences based on the 
underlying rationales that are applied to national leagues. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF STATE ANTITRUST LAW 
“All fifty states as well as the District of Columbia” have enacted 
“some type of antitrust statute.”16  Indeed, at least twenty-six states had 
some sort of antitrust prohibition by 1890, when the Sherman Act was 
introduced.17  The underlying forces that drove the passage of the Sherman 
Act also spurred the development of state antitrust law.18  In fact, 
fundamental concepts of federal antitrust law were based in part on 
principles developed by the judicial gloss of state courts interpreting state 
antitrust laws.19 
One of the main purposes of passing the Sherman Act was the 
supplementation of these state laws.20  The Sherman Act was to supplement 
state antitrust law by reaching restraints on interstate trade, while states 
would retain exclusive jurisdiction over all purely intrastate restraints.21  
Closely following the passage of the Sherman Act, many states adopted 
new or amended existing state antitrust statutes to mimic the federal 
statutes.22  Following these changes, state antitrust law began a “gradual 
decline” as it was viewed as “superfluous” in light of the federal law.23  
The decline was amplified in the wake of decisions like Wickard v. 
Filburn,24 which expanded the federal power to reach local activities seen 
as “affecting” commerce under the Commerce Clause.25  The rationale in 
 
 16. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 633 (7th 
ed. 2012) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]. 
 17. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES 
1-21 (3d ed. 2004). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 400 (1927) (stating 
that price fixing among competitors is illegal per se based on state case law establishing that 
principle). 
 20. 21 Cong. Rec. 2454, 2457 (1890). 
 21. 14 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2401, at 336 (3d 
ed. 2012). 
 22. Id. at 336–37. 
 23. Id. at 336. 
 24. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 25. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2401, at 336; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 
(“The present Chief Justice has said in summary of the present state of the law: ‘The 
commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the 
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Wickard led courts to apply the Sherman Act to purely intrastate activity, 
significantly diminishing the role of state antitrust law.26 
In the 1970s, however, state antitrust law experienced a revival thanks 
in part to treble-damage class action lawsuits in which states were part of 
the plaintiff class.27  Another contributing factor was the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.28  There, the 
Court denied damages to indirect purchasers under federal law.29  The 
decision in Illinois Brick left state legislatures feeling pressure to address 
the apparent gap that now existed in federal antitrust law.30  As a result, 
many state legislatures amended their antitrust statutes to allow indirect 
purchasers to recover damages.31  This was one of the few instances where 
state legislatures and state courts deviated from the federal law.32  Still, 
however, most state antitrust statutes mimic the federal statutes.33 
While the antitrust laws of most states track the language of the 
federal statutes closely, federal case law on substantive issues is not 
necessarily regarded as precedential.34  Some state courts regard the federal 
case law as precedential, while others use the federal case law as a 
persuasive source of authority when addressing issues of first impression.35  
However, state antitrust law is not preempted simply because of the 
existence of federal antitrust statutes.36  Regardless, it is clear that the role 
 
states.  It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . .’”) 
(citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). 
 26. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229–30 
(1948); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362 (1943). 
 27. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2401, at 337. 
 28. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 29. Id. at 735 (“We thus decline to construe § 4 to permit offensive use of a pass-on 
theory against an alleged violator that could not use the same theory as a defense in an 
action by direct purchasers.”). 
 30. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2401, at 338. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. ¶ 2410, at 350–51.  Specifically, most state antitrust statutes mimic the Sherman 
Act.  Id. ¶ 2401, at 338.  Some states have enacted the equivalent of the Clayton Act, while 
fewer states have enacted a version of Robinson-Patman Act.  Id. 
 34. Id. ¶ 2410, at 350–53. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. ¶ 2401, at 336 (“Most important, from the outset Congress declared its intention 
not to preempt the antitrust and other competition laws of the several states, but rather to 
supplement them.”). 
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of state antitrust laws with respect to certain industries has become severely 
limited.37 
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE ANTITRUST LAW 
Although state antitrust statutes may be able to reach interstate 
activity, the Commerce Clause38 still serves as a protective shield that 
limits the scope of state antitrust enforcement.  Through the Constitution, 
Congress is granted the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States . . . .”39  Phrased as an affirmative grant of power, the 
Commerce Clause also contains a negative or “dormant” command “that 
‘create[s] an area of trade free from interference by the States’” and 
“prevents a State from ‘jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole’ 
by ‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that 
commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.’”40  This operation 
“of the Commerce Clause limits state interference with interstate 
commerce”, even without legislation implemented by Congress.41 
As a limit on State powers, the Commerce Clause can invalidate state 
statutes where the statute explicitly discriminates against interstate 
commerce or where the indirect effects on interstate commerce impose a 
“burden on interstate commerce that is ‘clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits[.]’”42  If a statute facially discriminates against 
out-of-state activity, it will be struck down unless it “advances a legitimate 
local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”43  The Supreme Court in Granholm v. 
 
 37. Id. ¶ 2403, at 347–48.  Specifically, the role of state antitrust in the regulation of 
national collegiate and professional sports leagues has become severely limited.  Id.  The 
development of the diminishing role of state antitrust law with respect to that industry will 
be discussed and analyzed in detail below. 
 38. Particularly the “dormant” side of the Commerce Clause may still be able to reach 
interstate activity. 
 39. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 40. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) 
(quoting Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) and Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)). 
 41. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. Nev. 1992). 
 42. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 43. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)); see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Daviess Cty., 434 
F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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Heald44 held that “state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate 
‘differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”45  However, state antitrust laws 
are statutes of general application and are not likely facially 
discriminatory.46  Thus, state antitrust statutes are more typically 
challenged as excessively burdensome on interstate commerce.47 
State courts in the first half of the twentieth century construed their 
antitrust statutes to exclude interstate commerce from their reach, based 
largely on an idea of mutually exclusive sovereignties.48  As federal 
constitutional law shifted to allow Congress to reach intrastate activity,49 
the notion of mutually exclusive sovereignties began to dissipate and state 
courts reanalyzed earlier constructions of their antitrust laws.50  
Consequently, state courts began to broaden the scope of their antitrust 
statutes, holding that their antitrust laws could reach both interstate and 
intrastate activities.51 
However, the Commerce Clause does not nullify the application of a 
state antitrust law simply because the statute can reach and may have 
effects beyond state lines.52  Instead, the general rule, discussed in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc.,53 is “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed 
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
 
 44. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 461. 
 45. Id. at 472 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99). 
 46. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 16, at 639. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. See also Abbott Labs. v. Durrett, 746 So. 2d 316, 330–31 (Ala. 1999) (noting 
that the notion of mutually exclusive sovereignties influenced the interpretation of 
Alabama’s antitrust laws); Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 700 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Wis. 2005) 
(noting that early interpretation of Wisconsin antitrust law was based on the notion of 
mutually exclusive sovereignties).  The notion of mutually exclusive sovereignties stood for 
the idea that Congress could not regulate purely intrastate commerce and states could not 
regulate interstate commerce.  ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 16, at 639. 
 49. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that Congress 
could regulate purely intrastate activity of wheat farming because the activity affected 
interstate commerce). 
 50. See, e.g., Olstad, 700 N.W.2d at 155–56 (rejecting an interpretation of Wisconsin’s 
antitrust statute as being constrained to intrastate commerce). 
 51. See, e.g., Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813, 818–19 (Cal. 1980); Health Consultants 
v. Precision Instruments, 527 N.W.2d 596, 606–07 (Neb. 1995); State v. Sterling Theatres 
Co., 394 P.2d 226, 228 (Wash. 1964). 
 52. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 16, at 640; see also Osborn v. 
Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940). 
 53. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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benefits.”54  Thus, the court must balance the putative local benefit of a 
state’s antitrust act against the burden it places on interstate commerce.55 
State antitrust laws have held up against claims that they violate the 
Commerce Clause.56  In United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,57 the 
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that General 
Atomic Company (GAC) violated New Mexico’s antitrust laws despite 
arguments from GAC that the state’s antitrust laws violated the Commerce 
Clause.58  In that case, the plaintiff sued GAC alleging that its contract to 
supply a public utility company with uranium was in violation of New 
Mexico’s state antitrust laws.59  GAC first contended that the Commerce 
Clause bars the application of state antitrust law where the activities in 
question are overwhelmingly in interstate commerce.60  Citing a long line 
of cases, the court dismissed that argument, holding that state antitrust laws 
can “reach up to include the regulation of interstate commerce.”61 
Next, GAC, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,62 argued that the uranium market was a 
national market that “must be addressed uniformly by the federal 
government.”63  The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, rejected 
GAC’s argument,64 relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in the similar case of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.65  There, the 
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument posed by Gulf Oil and other oil 
companies with respect to the national scope of the petroleum market.66  In 
response to the argument, the Supreme Court stated that the Commerce 
Clause would only preempt an entire field when a “lack of national 
uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods.”67  In Exxon, 
 
 54. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 274 (N.M. 
1980). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 329. 
 59. Id. at 238. 
 60. Id. at 270. 
 61. Id. at 271. 
 62. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 63. United Nuclear Corp., 629 P.2d at 272. 
 64. Id. at 274. 
 65. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
 66. Id. at 128. 
 67. Id. at 128–29.  Specifically the Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e cannot adopt appellants’ novel suggestion that because the economic market 
for petroleum products is nationwide, no State has the power to regulate the retail 
marketing of gas.  Appellants point out that . . . the cumulative effect of this sort 
9
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however, the Supreme Court found that whatever cost the application of 
state antitrust law would have it did not warrant Commerce Clause 
preemption.68 
Relying on that reasoning, the New Mexico Supreme Court in United 
Nuclear held that the Commerce Clause did not foreclose state regulation 
of the uranium market.69  More importantly, the court in United Nuclear 
upheld the application of New Mexico’s antitrust law against GAC’s 
Commerce Clause attacks.70  The New Mexico Supreme Court, applying 
the balancing test from Pike, held that GAC’s compliance with the New 
Mexico antitrust statutes involved no “excessive cost of compliance.”71  
Commenting specifically on the burden imposed by application of state 
law, the court declared, “[t]he cost of compliance is nothing more than 
refraining from the kind of anti-competitive, predatory trade practices 
which federal law and the laws of virtually all states condemn.”72 
While the court in United Nuclear disagreed with the defendant’s 
Commerce Clause argument, the defendants argued an important rule 
associated with the relationship between the Commerce Clause and state 
statutes, which has been applied to state antitrust claims.73  The defendant 
relied on the general rule from Southern Pacific that certain areas of 
national commerce demand that their regulation be at the national level and 
any attempt to regulate at the state level should be inapplicable.74  In 
Southern Pacific, the Supreme Court held that state statutes are 
inapplicable where the statute has the tendency to “impede substantially the 
free flow of commerce from state to state, or to regulate those phases of the 
national commerce which, because of the need for national uniformity, 
 
of legislation may have serious implications for their national marketing 
operations.  While this concern is a significant one, we do not find that the 
Commerce Clause, by its own force, pre-empts the field of retail gas 
marketing . . . . [T]his Court has only rarely held that the Commerce Clause itself 
pre-empts an entire field from state regulation, and then only when a lack of 
national uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods . . . . In the absence 
of a relevant congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific 
discrimination against, or burdening of, interstate commerce, we cannot conclude 
that the States are without power to regulate in this area. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted). 
 68. Id. at 133–34. 
 69. United Nuclear Corp., 629 P.2d at 274. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 272. 
 74. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). 
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demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.”75  
The second part of that rule has been asserted as a justification by many 
national collegiate and professional sports leagues for the invalidation of 
state antitrust claims.76 
Since most state antitrust statutes mirror the language contained in the 
federal antitrust statutes there are arguably only very small incremental 
burdens in complying with state antitrust statutes.77  However, national 
collegiate and professional sports leagues have been able to overcome this 
argument by distinguishing the burden they face if forced to comply with 
state antitrust statutes.78  One of the strongest arguments for these leagues 
has been that “[n]o single state has a particularly significant interest in the 
operation of nationwide professional sports.”79 
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A DEFENSE FOR SPORTS LEAGUES 
The assertions of state antitrust claims against national collegiate and 
professional sports leagues necessarily raise Commerce Clause questions.80  
 
 75. Id. (citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)). 
 76. See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 677 (Cal. 1983).  
The San Diego Chargers, in the face of California state antitrust allegations, set forth the 
following arguments: 
[P]rofessional football is a unique activity of interstate commerce which requires 
nationally uniform governance, that only federal antitrust laws apply, that 
interstate commerce would be unreasonably burdened if state antitrust laws were 
applied to professional football’s interstate activities, and that application of the 
Cartwright Act was a violation of the commerce and supremacy clauses of the 
Constitution. 
Id. 
 77. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp., 629 P.2d at 274 (“[T]here is little likelihood 
that . . . an excessive cost of compliance will be imposed by piecemeal state [antitrust] 
regulation.  The cost of compliance is nothing more than refraining from the kind of 
anti-competitive, predatory trade practices which federal law and the laws of virtually all 
states condemn.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971), aff’d, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972) (“[I]f state regulation were permissible, the internal structure of the leagues would 
require compliance with the strictest state antitrust standard.”); Partee, 668 P.2d at 678 
(“The necessity of a nationwide league structure for the benefit of both teams and players 
for effective competition is evident as is the need for a nationally uniform set of rules 
governing the league structure.”). 
 79. United Nuclear Corp., 629 P.2d at 273. 
 80. These and other constitutional questions are also raised when state antitrust claims 
are asserted outside of the sports context as well.  See William L. Reynolds II & James D. 
Wright, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Maryland Antitrust Act, 36 MD. L. REV. 323, 340 
(1976) (“Because most state antitrust acts, including Maryland’s, assert jurisdiction over 
activities in interstate commerce, there are latent constitutional questions in every state 
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In addressing those questions, sports leagues have generally been protected 
from state law claims by the operation of the Commerce Clause.81 
A. Professional Sports Leagues82 
Protection for professional sports leagues against state law allegations, 
and more specifically state antitrust allegations, began with an exemption 
that was extended to apply to professional baseball.83  A trilogy of cases 
established the professional baseball exemption.84  The exemption was first 
announced in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League 
of Professional Baseball Clubs.85  There, the plaintiff, a Baltimore baseball 
club, was left without competitors after the National League bought out 
seven of the other Federal League teams.86  As a result, the Baltimore club 
sued the National League alleging a violation of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.87  In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Court held that the 
Sherman Act did not apply to baseball because baseball did not involve 
interstate commerce,88 establishing an exemption from federal antitrust law 
for professional baseball. 
Thirty years later, the Court revisited the issue of baseball’s 
exemption in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.89 after the interpretation of 
interstate commerce had significantly changed.90  In Toolson, pitcher 
George Toolson sued the New York Yankees and Major League Baseball 
asserting that baseball’s reserve system violated federal antitrust law.91  
Toolson signed a contract with the New York Yankees and refused to 
 
antitrust case . . . . If those state attempts [to regulate professional baseball] had succeeded, 
professional baseball, and indeed all professional sports, might have been blanketed by a 
veritable ‘crazy quilt of state law.’”). 
 81. See, e.g., Partee, 668 P.2d at 697; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. 
Supp. 1476, 1488 (D. Nev. 1992). 
 82. Major League Baseball (MLB), National Football League (NFL), National 
Basketball League (NBA). 
 83. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
 84. Id.; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 
356 (1953). 
 85. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 208–09. 
 86. Id. at 207. 
 87. Id. at 208. 
 88. Id. at 208–09. 
 89. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356. 
 90. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 91. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 362. 
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report from one farm team to another.92  As a result, the Yankees placed 
Toolson on its ineligible list.93  However, because of the league’s reserve 
system, no other team wished to sign him.94  In Toolson, the Court upheld 
the baseball exemption without much explanation. 95  While the Court in 
Toolson declined to overrule the baseball exemption set forth in Federal 
Baseball, it left open questions as to its status.96  Whatever issues were 
unsettled after Toolson, the Supreme Court addressed and settled in Flood 
v. Kuhn.97 
Curt Flood, the St. Louis Cardinals’ centerfielder, brought suit against 
the Commissioner after the Commissioner denied Flood’s request to 
become a free agent.98  Flood asserted both a federal and state antitrust 
claim against the Commissioner of Baseball.99  When Flood arrived at the 
United States Supreme Court, the Court upheld professional baseball’s 
exemption from federal antitrust laws and affirmed the trial court’s 
decision extending the exemption to state antitrust laws.100 
In addition to extending baseball’s exemption to state antitrust law, 
the trial court in Flood also held that state antitrust laws were inapplicable 
based on an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.101  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming the trial court’s 
decision, stated: 
 
 92. Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the 
Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 60 (1997). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 56–60. 
 95. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.  The Court gave the following explanation for extending 
the baseball exemption: 
The business [of baseball] has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the 
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. . . .  We think 
that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the 
antitrust laws it should be by legislation.  Without re-examination of the 
underlying issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs, . . . so far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of 
including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws. 
Id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 
1971), aff’d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 98. Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972). 
 99. Id. at 264–65. 
 100. Id. at 284. 
 101. Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 273–75. 
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[W]here the nature of an enterprise is such that differing state regulation, 
although not conflicting, requires the enterprise to comply with the strictest 
standard of several states in order to continue an interstate business 
extending over many states, the extra-territorial effect which the application 
of a particular state law would exact constitutes, absent a strong state 
interest, an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.102 
The Second Circuit pointed out that professional baseball’s structure 
makes it unique.103  Although the league is made up of separate entities, the 
entities depend on the league “to further the ends of their sports 
competition.”104  Since the members are dependent upon the league, “it is 
the league structure at which any state antitrust regulation [is] aimed.”105  
Consequently, any league that extends over several states would be 
required to comply with the strictest state antitrust standard for effective 
administration.106  The Second Circuit reasoned that this burden 
outweighed any one state’s interest in regulating baseball’s internal 
structure and held that “the Commerce Clause preclude[d] the application 
here of state antitrust law.”107  The Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed.108 
The rationale in Flood relates back to the rule developed in Southern 
Pacific that the Commerce Clause will invalidate state statutes that attempt 
to regulate “those phases of national commerce which, because of the need 
for national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed 
by a single authority.”109  This rule has been the primary defense of sports 
leagues seeking protection from state antitrust violations.  The holding in 
Flood and the rule from Southern Pacific have also led courts to hold state 
antitrust regulation inapplicable to professional football110 and professional 
basketball.111 
 
 102. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971) aff’d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (citing 
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 774–75 (1945)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 267–68. 
 106. Id. at 268. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 109. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (citing Cooley v. 
Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)). 
 110. See, e.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 679 (Cal. 1983) 
(holding that application of California’s antitrust statutes to activity of the professional 
violated the Commerce Clause); Matuszak v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 725, 729 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the issue of whether a professional football player’s 
contract with his team violated Texas’s antitrust laws was not to be decided by the state 
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol38/iss1/4
2016] OUT OF BOUNDS 123 
Professional sports leagues argue that the structure of the leagues is 
such that their regulation requires national uniformity because state 
legislation will have an impact beyond a given team.112  In each of these 
leagues, the teams are dependent upon the league for scheduling league 
play.113  It is through the schedule of games that the teams are able to 
further their competitive interests.  Moreover, a uniform set of rules and 
regulations for the league produces more efficient and effective 
competition throughout the league.  These arguments have persuaded 
courts to find state antitrust laws inapplicable to the activities of 
professional sports leagues.114 
B. National Collegiate Athletic Association115 
While the case law was settled with respect to professional leagues, it 
is still unclear whether the same protection would apply for amateur 
leagues, especially since the Supreme Court has declined to extend the 
“baseball exception” to other industries engaged in similar types of 
performances.116  Even so, the NCAA has asserted the Commerce Clause as 
a defense when faced with state antitrust or other state law claims.117  
Relying on the courts’ decisions pertaining to professional sports leagues, 
 
court, and under Flood v. Kuhn professional football was subject to federal antitrust law not 
state antitrust law). 
 111. See, e.g., Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (holding that baseball’s “unique exception” should extend to basketball, thus 
dismissing state antitrust claims); HMC Mgmt. Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 
So. 2d 700, 706 (La. Ct. App. 1979). 
 112. See Valley Bank of Nev. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 914 F.2d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(“Professional sports leagues have a limited number of teams, with no more than a few and 
rarely more than two teams in any state.  The challenged state legislation in each case would 
have had significant impact on the whole league fabric, not just on the state’s one or two 
teams.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Partee, 668 P.2d at 678. 
 114. See, e.g., id. (“Following Flood v. Kuhn, state antitrust regulation has been held 
inapplicable to professional basketball and professional football.  No case has been found 
applying state antitrust laws to the interstate activities of professional sports.” (citations 
omitted)); Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 881; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1971). 
 115. Referred heretofore as the NCAA. 
 116. See Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923) (declining to 
extend the baseball exemption to travelling vaudeville performances, which were very 
popular during the time period when the baseball exemption was fashioned). 
 117. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 (D. 
Nev. 1992); English v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 439 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (La. Ct. App. 
1983). 
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the NCAA has been successful in invoking the Commerce Clause as a 
defense.118 
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller,119 the United States 
District Court for the District of Nevada extended Commerce Clause 
protection to the NCAA in the face of state law claims.120  There, the 
NCAA sought a declaratory judgment action that a Nevada state statute121 
was void because it excessively burdened interstate commerce in violation 
of the Commerce Clause.122  The plaintiffs in Miller asserted a claim that 
the NCAA enforcement procedure for rules violations should be conducted 
in conformity with sections 398.155 through 398.255 of the Nevada 
Revised Statutes.123  The procedural requirements of the Nevada state 
statutes conflicted with the procedural requirements administered by the 
NCAA Committee on Infractions for the investigation of rules violations.124 
The NCAA argued that its similarities to professional sports leagues 
call for the extension of Commerce Clause protection to its activities.125  
The sheer size of the NCAA alone seems reason enough to extend the 
rationale underlying the professional sports exception.  The NCAA is an 
unincorporated association made up of more than 1,200 member 
institutions across all fifty states.126  At the time Flood was decided, 
professional baseball only had twenty-four member teams and professional 
basketball had only eighteen-member teams.127  The NCAA, however, 
provided other persuasive reasons why the professional sports exception 
should apply.128 
In support of its position, the NCAA argued that its “ability to 
accomplish its goals of scholarship, sportsmanship, and amateurism 
depends to a substantial degree on the creation of nationally uniform rules 
under which teams can compete on an equal basis.”129  Furthermore, the 
NCAA argued that “[i]n order to satisfactorily achieve these goals, the 
 
 118. See Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482; English, 439 So. 2d at 1224. 
 119. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1476. 
 120. Id. at 1485. 
 121. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155–398.255 (1991) (providing several procedural 
requirements for hearings). 
 122. See Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479. 
 123. Id. at 1480. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1482. 
 126. Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership 
[https://perma.cc/QLD8-Y34K] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 127. Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 128. See Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482–86. 
 129. Id. at 1484. 
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NCAA’s enforcement procedures must be applied even-handedly and 
uniformly on a national basis.”130  In deciding that the Commerce Clause 
barred the application of the Nevada statute to the NCAA’s activities, the 
court reasoned that “[t]his provision and similar provisions in other states 
would strip the NCAA of the authority to freely adopt its own procedural 
regulations.”131  The court further explained “[t]he likely practical effect of 
the statute would be to compel the NCAA to adopt the procedural rules 
enacted by the Nevada Legislature, thereby allowing the Nevada 
Legislature to effectively dictate enforcement proceedings in states other 
than Nevada.”132  For these reasons, the court held that the Commerce 
Clause precluded the application of the Nevada statute.133  While Miller did 
not involve the assertion of a state antitrust claim, the court’s reasoning 
could easily be applied to invalidate the operation of state antitrust statutes 
against athletic conferences. 
In English v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the plaintiff, Jon 
English, asserted that the NCAA was a monopoly operating in violation of 
Louisiana antitrust law.134  The lawsuit stemmed from an NCAA regulation 
that requires student-athletes who transfer from member institution to 
member institution to sit out for one full year.135  The court, following the 
direction of Flood, held that the Louisiana antitrust statute could not be 
applied to the actions of the NCAA.136  Thus, the professional sports 
exception had been extended to encompass national amateur athletics, at 
least in some jurisdictions. 
IV. THE EXTENSION OF COMMERCE CLAUSE PROTECTION TO REGIONAL137 
ATHLETIC CONFERENCES 
The next logical extension of Commerce Clause protection should be 
to smaller, regional collegiate athletic conferences.  Regional athletic 
conferences should be shielded from state antitrust claims which attack 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1484–85. 
 133. Id. at 1485. 
 134. English v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 439 So. 2d 1218, 1222 (La. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1224. 
 137. Regional athletic conferences refers to non “national” conferences, such as the 
Power 5 conferences comprising the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 
12 Conference, PAC-12 Conference, and Southeastern Conference.  With respect to college 
athletics, “national” conferences would be the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), and others. 
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league rules that are necessary to the operation of the league.  More 
specifically, the Commerce Clause should shield athletic conferences from 
state antitrust claims alleging that conference withdrawal penalties are 
anticompetitive, no matter the actual merits of the claims.  As previously 
stated, it is undisputable that these conferences are subject to federal 
antitrust regulation and suits.138  However, since federal antitrust law does 
not preempt state antitrust law, conferences are currently left exposed to 
state antitrust allegations.139  Extension of Commerce Clause protection to 
these regional conferences would curtail this exposure.  Consequently, the 
conferences will be able to more effectively govern their own leagues and 
stimulate intercollegiate competition. 
Sports leagues like the ACC, and other conferences, are different from 
most commercial actors because their very nature requires that they be 
regulated on a national level if they are to exist at all.  It is because of this 
uniqueness that courts across the United States have repeatedly held that 
burdens of applying any state statute to the activities of a sports league 
excessively outweigh any putative benefits.140  As a result, sports leagues 
have been protected from state antitrust claims by the operation of the 
Commerce Clause.  It follows that extension of this protection should be 
afforded to collegiate athletic conferences that are viewed as “regional” in 
nature because of the striking similarities in structure and activities of the 
leagues. 
The historical trajectory of this sports exception suggests that regional 
athletic conferences are the next to be protected.141  Because of the 
similarities between these regional leagues and leagues that have been 
afforded protection by the Commerce Clause, the arguments and rationales 
for extending the protection are essentially the same. 
Regional athletic conferences share similar common organizational 
structures with national collegiate and professional sports leagues.  For 
example, the ACC is an unincorporated association sharing the same 
 
 138. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 
(N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 139. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, ¶ 2401, at 336. 
 140. See generally supra Part III. 
 141. Professional baseball was first afforded protection against state antitrust claims 
because of the operation of the Commerce Clause.  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1971).  
Protection was then extended to both professional football and professional basketball 
leagues.  Partee v, San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1983); Robertson v. 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  Finally, the protection was 
extended beyond the scope of professional sports and into amateur athletics when the 
NCAA was afforded the protection of the Commerce Clause.  English v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 439 So. 2d 1218 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
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structure as the NCAA and NFL, which are both unincorporated 
associations.  More importantly, goals of conferences like the ACC142 are 
essentially the same as the goals of the professional and national sports 
leagues.  In essence, the goal of a regional conference is to deal with the 
athletic and academic relationships between players and universities.143  
Each member of a conference voluntarily agrees to be bound by the 
conference’s constitution and by-laws.  It is through its by-laws and rules 
that a given conference can attain these goals.  By that measure, it is 
imperative that the by-laws and operating rules be applied uniformly across 
the conference in order to have any possibility of functioning effectively.144  
Furthermore, the members competing within these leagues depend on the 
conference to establish a uniform set of rules governing the league 
structure.145 
Additionally, there is no meaningful difference between the interstate 
activities of these regional conferences and those of other sports leagues—
professional and amateur—whose internal structure calls for insulation 
from state antitrust scrutiny.  Each of these leagues is made up of a number 
of member institutions located in multiple states.  For example, the ACC is 
comprised of fifteen146 member institutions from ten different states.147  
 
 142. The mission statement of the ACC is: 
The Atlantic Coast Conference, through its member institutions, seeks to 
maximize the educational and athletic opportunities of its student-athletes while 
enriching their quality of life.  It strives to do so by affording individuals equitable 
opportunity to pursue academic excellence and compete successfully at the 
highest level of intercollegiate athletics competition in a broad spectrum of sports 
and championships.  The Conference will provide leadership in attaining these 
goals, by promoting diversity and mutual trust among its member institutions, in a 
spirit of fairness for all.  It strongly adheres to the principles of integrity and 
sportsmanship, and supports the total development of the student-athlete and each 
member institution’s athletics departmental staff, with the intent of producing 
enlightened leadership for tomorrow. 
ATL. COAST CONFERENCE, ACC MANUAL 2 (2012–2013), http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/
schools/bc/genrel/auto_pdf/2012-13/misc_non_event/2012_13_ACC.pdf [http://perma.cc/
X8ST-NHUQ]. 
 143. Id.  The “essence” of the regional conference is the same as that of the NCAA but 
on a smaller scale. 
 144. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971), aff’d, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972). 
 145. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Nev. 1992). 
 146. Schools, ACC, http://www.theacc.com/ (hold mouse over “Schools” tab) 
[https://perma.cc/68Y9-7VUD] (last updated Jan. 5, 2016).  The ACC includes Boston 
College, Clemson University, Florida State University, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
University of Maryland at College Park, University of North Carolina, North Carolina State 
University, University of Notre Dame, University of Pittsburgh, Syracuse University, 
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Additionally, each league engages in interleague competition, meaning that 
the reach of any given league is beyond just the territorial limits of its 
member institutions.  Moreover, leagues are in national competition with 
one another for national television contracts.  In fact, several leagues have 
developed their own television networks that reach a national audience.148  
Thus, whether the footprint of these conferences is regional or national 
should not be the determinative factor,149 because it is the structure of these 
leagues that mandates their regulation be made uniformly.150 
The relevant question then is whether the application of any given 
state’s antitrust statute to any league policy would unduly burden the 
conference’s activities in each of the other states in which it operates.151  
The league policy in focus here is a withdrawal penalty.  In each case 
where the Commerce Clause has foreclosed the application of state 
antitrust law to a sports league’s activities, the challenged league rule has 
been essential to the effective functioning of the league.152  Conference 
withdrawal penalties are essential to the effective functioning of the 
conference.  The withdrawal penalties protect remaining members from 
disruption to the organization, the functions of the conference, and its 
members when a fellow member departs. 
Any application of state antitrust law to a conference withdrawal 
penalty would excessively burden the conference’s activities.  The 
application of state antitrust law causes an undue burden because its 
application would “require[] the enterprise to comply with the strictest 
standard of several states in order to continue an interstate business 
 
University of Virginia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and Wake Forest 
University.  Id. 
 147. Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
 148. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) has developed the SEC Network 
and the Big Ten Conference has established the Big Ten Network.  See About the SEC 
Network, SEC, http://secsports.go.com/article/11130708/about-the-sec-network 
[https://perma.cc/94P3-3FJF] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); About Us, BIG TEN NETWORK, 
http://btn.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/VH6D-QUDP] (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 149. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has never required that the burden placed on 
interstate commerce be national in scope in order to render a state statute unconstitutional.  
See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (“Generally speaking, the 
Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one 
state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.” (citing CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987)). 
 150. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1971), aff’d, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 151. See Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 678 (Cal. 1983). 
 152. See, e.g., id.; English v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 439 So. 2d 1218, 1220, 
1223–24 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
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extending over many states.”153  Consequently, the state with the strictest 
antitrust laws would effectively regulate the activities of the conference in 
all of the conference’s other member states.  What is more, the application 
of state antitrust law “would strip the [ACC] of the authority to freely adopt 
its own procedural regulations.”154  This extraterritorial effect, which the 
application of a particular state law would exact, constitutes, absent a 
strong state interest, an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.155  In 
the context of sports leagues, there is no corresponding state interest 
because “[n]o single state has a particularly significant interest in the 
operation of . . . sports.”156  Thus, the answer to the relevant question of 
whether application of any given state’s antitrust statute to any league 
policy would unduly burden the conference’s activities should 
unequivocally be yes.  As a result, Commerce Clause protection should be 
extended to smaller “regional” conferences to insulate them from state 
antitrust attacks. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commerce Clause can invalidate state statutes where the statute 
explicitly discriminates against interstate commerce or where the indirect 
effects on interstate commerce impose a “burden on interstate commerce 
that is ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”157  
Courts have considered the burden on commerce vis a vis the putative local 
benefits of state antitrust laws in the context sports leagues.158  The result of 
these cases is that national collegiate and professional sports leagues have 
been afforded protection from the Commerce Clause in the face of state 
antitrust attacks.159  This protection should be extended to regional 
collegiate athletic conferences to protect them from allegations that a rule 
which is critical to the operation of the league, especially a conference 
withdrawal penalty, is in violation of state antitrust law. 
The nature of these regional athletic conferences requires that their 
rules be both adopted and applied uniformly in order to ensure effective 
operation of the league.  Subjecting the conference to state antitrust laws 
potentially fractures the league structure and operation along state lines.  
 
 153. Flood, 443 F.2d at 267. 
 154. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Nev. 1992). 
 155. Id. 
 156. United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 273 (N.M. 1980). 
 157. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1940)). 
 158. See generally supra Part III. 
 159. Id. 
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Extending Commerce Clause protection to regional athletic conferences 
against state antitrust claims allows the conferences to evenhandedly 
enforce league policies, which will allow the conferences to operate 
effectively and efficiently and attain the collective goals of the conference.  
Furthermore, individual members are not left without recourse for alleged 
violations.  These members can seek redress through federal antitrust laws 
to which the conferences should indisputably be subject.160  Thus, the 
extension of Commerce Clause protection will not compromise the 
interests of either the conference or its members, as members are not left 
without a means to check the conference’s authority, while the Commerce 
Clause protection allows the conference to operate uniformly, effectively, 
and efficiently. 
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